In game theory, a strategy for a player is dominant if, regardless of what any other player does, the strategy earns a better payoff than any other. If the payoff is strictly better, the strategy is named strictly dominant, but if it is simply not worse, then it is called weakly dominant. We investigate the parameterized complexity of two problems relevant to the notion of domination among strategies. First, we study the parameterized complexity of the MINIMUM MIXED DOMINATING STRATEGY SET problem, the problem of deciding whether there exists a mixed strategy of size at most k that dominates a given strategy of a player. We show that the problem can be solved in polynomial time on win-lose games. Also, we show that it is a fixed-parameter t...
In this paper we show that some decision problems regarding the computation of Nash equilibria are t...
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points ou...
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points ou...
We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We ...
We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We f...
In game theory, an action is said to be weakly dominated if there exists another action of the same ...
International audienceThis paper deals with the computational complexity of some yes /no problems as...
International audienceThis paper deals with the computational complexity of some yes /no problems as...
Two common criticisms of Nash equilibrium are its dependence on very demanding epistemic assumptions...
We introduce a weakening of standard gametheoretic dominance conditions, called δdominance, which en...
The modern mathematical treatment of the study of decisions taken by participants whose interests ar...
The concept of strict dominance provides a technique that can be used normatively to predict the pla...
International audienceWe study the parameterized complexity of domination-type problems. (sigma,rho)...
International audienceWe study the parameterized complexity of domination-type problems. (sigma,rho)...
AbstractIf a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best resp...
In this paper we show that some decision problems regarding the computation of Nash equilibria are t...
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points ou...
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points ou...
We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We ...
We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We f...
In game theory, an action is said to be weakly dominated if there exists another action of the same ...
International audienceThis paper deals with the computational complexity of some yes /no problems as...
International audienceThis paper deals with the computational complexity of some yes /no problems as...
Two common criticisms of Nash equilibrium are its dependence on very demanding epistemic assumptions...
We introduce a weakening of standard gametheoretic dominance conditions, called δdominance, which en...
The modern mathematical treatment of the study of decisions taken by participants whose interests ar...
The concept of strict dominance provides a technique that can be used normatively to predict the pla...
International audienceWe study the parameterized complexity of domination-type problems. (sigma,rho)...
International audienceWe study the parameterized complexity of domination-type problems. (sigma,rho)...
AbstractIf a finite strategic game is strictly dominance solvable, then every simultaneous best resp...
In this paper we show that some decision problems regarding the computation of Nash equilibria are t...
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points ou...
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points ou...