We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can choose whether to buy or sell the good. We derive conditions under which a non-autarkic equilibrium exists and when the only equilibrium is autarky. Autarky is ‘nice’ (robust to small perturbations in the game) when it is the only equilibrium, and ‘very nice’ (robust to large perturbations) when no gains from trade exist. We characterize economies where autarky is nice but not very nice; that is, when gains from trade exist and yet no trade takes place
In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infini...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (19...
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange...
We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can cho...
We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can cho...
This paper analyses the international trade dynamics between two countries as a two-player, non-zero...
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Si...
We show the existence of a pure strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a model of noncooperative exch...
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange ...
We show the existence of a pure strategy Cournot–Nash equilibrium for a model of noncooperative exch...
In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship b...
We show the existence of a pure strategy Cournot–Nash equilibrium for a model of noncooperative exch...
In this thesis, I study the strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium by following...
In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship b...
This paper analyses the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market with strategic traders. A ...
In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infini...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (19...
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange...
We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can cho...
We study a strategic market game in which traders are endowed with both a good and money and can cho...
This paper analyses the international trade dynamics between two countries as a two-player, non-zero...
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Si...
We show the existence of a pure strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a model of noncooperative exch...
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange ...
We show the existence of a pure strategy Cournot–Nash equilibrium for a model of noncooperative exch...
In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship b...
We show the existence of a pure strategy Cournot–Nash equilibrium for a model of noncooperative exch...
In this thesis, I study the strategic foundations of oligopolies in general equilibrium by following...
In this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless part, we analyze the relationship b...
This paper analyses the formation of trading groups in a bilateral market with strategic traders. A ...
In this paper, we extend the non-cooperative analysis of oligopoly to exchange economics with infini...
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (19...
Bilateral oligopoly is a simple model of exchange in which a finite set of sellers seek to exchange...