peer-reviewedThe Dolev-Yao model has been widely used in protocol verificaion and has been implemented in many protocol verifiers. There are strong assumptions underlying this model, such as perfect cryptography: the aim of the present work is to propose an approach to weaken this hypothesis, by means of probabilistic considerations on the strength of crypto- graphic functions. Such an approach may effectively be implemented in actual protocol verifiers. The Yahalom proto- col is used as an easy example to show this approach
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to...
International audienceWe address the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying s...
Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols ty...
AbstractThis paper contributes to further closing the gap between formal analysis and concrete imple...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
AbstractWe consider secrecy and authentication in a simple process calculus with cryptographic primi...
Formal analysis has a long and successful track record in the automated verification of security pro...
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a Dolev-Yao model with hash functions and establish its soundness...
Dolev and Yao initiated an approach to studying crypto-graphic protocols which abstracts from possib...
Abstract. We present a novel equivalence for cryptographic expressions that overcomes two limitation...
International audienceAfter a short introduction to the field of security protocol verification, we ...
This paper contributes to further closing the gap between formal analysis and concrete implementatio...
Abstract. After a short introduction to the field of security protocol verification, we present the ...
We use a special operational semantics which helps us in predicting quantitative measures on systems...
The design of security protocols is extremely subtle and is prone to serious faults. Many tools for ...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to...
International audienceWe address the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying s...
Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols ty...
AbstractThis paper contributes to further closing the gap between formal analysis and concrete imple...
AbstractWe propose a probabilistic framework for the analysis of security protocols. The proposed fr...
AbstractWe consider secrecy and authentication in a simple process calculus with cryptographic primi...
Formal analysis has a long and successful track record in the automated verification of security pro...
AbstractIn this paper, we consider a Dolev-Yao model with hash functions and establish its soundness...
Dolev and Yao initiated an approach to studying crypto-graphic protocols which abstracts from possib...
Abstract. We present a novel equivalence for cryptographic expressions that overcomes two limitation...
International audienceAfter a short introduction to the field of security protocol verification, we ...
This paper contributes to further closing the gap between formal analysis and concrete implementatio...
Abstract. After a short introduction to the field of security protocol verification, we present the ...
We use a special operational semantics which helps us in predicting quantitative measures on systems...
The design of security protocols is extremely subtle and is prone to serious faults. Many tools for ...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of cryptographic protocols. In contrast to...
International audienceWe address the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying s...
Automated tools such as model checkers and theorem provers for the analysis of security protocols ty...