Understanding the Informational Content of Insider Trades

This paper examines the informational content of insider trades and the impact of the Sarbanes Oxley Act on the ability of outside investors to use this information. I find that while the new reporting requirement speeds up the incorporation of insiders’ information into the market, there still exists an opportunity for attentive outsiders. The studies also address how the increased market efficiency has affected the differences between insiders, such as top-level executives and the rest of insiders. I find that the Sarbanes Oxley Act has greatly leveled the playing field in terms of how outsiders perceive these groups. Further, I extend the analysis of identifying opportunistic insiders. I find that using 8K corporate events in addition to quarterly earnings announcements, we are able to more efficiently label insiders as opportunistic compared to previous studies. Finally, I extend the literature on institutional investors by analyzing the link between this group and insider activity. I show that the previous findings of institutional investors following insiders is being driven by a subset of institutions, and I find evidence to support important distinguishing characteristics of institutional investors indicating institutions should not be studied as a whole, but in groups.