Why do legislators invest scarce time and resources into forming and maintaining informal legislative groups that provide no obvious benefits? Legislative member organizations (LMOs)-such as caucuses in the US Congress, cross-party groups in the Scottish Parliament, and intergroups in the European Parliament--exist in numerous law-making bodies around the world parallel to the formal legislative institutions of parties and committees. Yet unlike parties and committees, LMOs play no obvious role in the legislative process. This project constitutes the first look at LMOs in a cross-national perspective and employs a mixed-methods approach that is of interest to scholars across several disciplines, including political science, sociology, econo...
We propose a new methodology for inferring political actors’ latent memberships in communities of co...
This article develops and tests a theory of party group lobbying that demonstrates how the European ...
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative ...
What explains variation in legislative effectiveness where party systems are fragmented and not poli...
This article challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that t...
This paper addresses the issue of “cheap talk” in the legislative process. Specifically, it asks the...
This paper challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that the...
Over the past five years, legislative studies have emerged as a field of inquiry in political scienc...
What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups a...
Specialization and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than the exc...
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single...
Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allie...
Do political and legislative ties matter as much as conventional partisan or institutional factors f...
Social network analysis has become an increasingly important tool among political scientists for und...
In this study, we explore the determinants of cosponsorship activity within state legislatures. Prev...
We propose a new methodology for inferring political actors’ latent memberships in communities of co...
This article develops and tests a theory of party group lobbying that demonstrates how the European ...
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative ...
What explains variation in legislative effectiveness where party systems are fragmented and not poli...
This article challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that t...
This paper addresses the issue of “cheap talk” in the legislative process. Specifically, it asks the...
This paper challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that the...
Over the past five years, legislative studies have emerged as a field of inquiry in political scienc...
What explains Members of European Parliament's (MEPs’) decisions to recognize some interest groups a...
Specialization and delegation of policy leadership within committees is the norm rather than the exc...
We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single...
Why do interest groups lobby allied legislators if they already agree? One possibility is that allie...
Do political and legislative ties matter as much as conventional partisan or institutional factors f...
Social network analysis has become an increasingly important tool among political scientists for und...
In this study, we explore the determinants of cosponsorship activity within state legislatures. Prev...
We propose a new methodology for inferring political actors’ latent memberships in communities of co...
This article develops and tests a theory of party group lobbying that demonstrates how the European ...
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral incentives and legislative ...