We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and ...
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 2008...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out th...
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally st...
We establish NP-completeness of two problems on core stable coalitions in hedonic games. In the firs...
We investigate the computational complexity of a decision problem in hedonic coalition formation gam...
International audienceThe core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended...
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games. In part...
We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-valued solution concepts that...
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend o...
In this note we introduce the class of partitioning hedonic games, which extends, to the field of he...
In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper,...
URL des Documents de travail : https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr/publications/Documents de tra...
Largeness of the core is sufficient for stability of the core. In general the necessity is not known...
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and ...
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 2008...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out th...
We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally st...
We establish NP-completeness of two problems on core stable coalitions in hedonic games. In the firs...
We investigate the computational complexity of a decision problem in hedonic coalition formation gam...
International audienceThe core is a well-known and fundamental notion of stability in games intended...
We study relationships between different relaxed notions of core stability in hedonic games. In part...
We introduce two new monotonicity properties for core concepts: single-valued solution concepts that...
In this paper we study hedonic games where each player views every other player either as a friend o...
In this note we introduce the class of partitioning hedonic games, which extends, to the field of he...
In general, there are examples of TU games where the core is stable but is not large. In this paper,...
URL des Documents de travail : https://centredeconomiesorbonne.cnrs.fr/publications/Documents de tra...
Largeness of the core is sufficient for stability of the core. In general the necessity is not known...
The top coalition property of Banerjee et al. (2001) and the common ranking property of Farrell and ...
Dimitrov D, Haake C-J. Stable governments and the semistrict core. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR. 2008...
We provide an axiomatic characterization of the core of games in effectiveness form. We point out th...
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