In perfectly competitive markets taxes and quotas are fully equivalent measures for environmental protection. Based on this regulators' revealed preferences for quotas over that of fees finds its explanation in the procedures and spirits of political decision making. This paper offers another explanation: Ordinary welfare economic considerations make a quota preferable to a tax when regulating polluting firms in monopolistically competitive markets
International audienceIn this paper, we consider competitive polluting firms that outsource their ab...
There is a tendency among policy-makers and industry lobbyists toward "specific", "relative" or "out...
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Productio...
In perfectly competitive markets taxes and quotas are fully equivalent measures for environmental pr...
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Productio...
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and poll...
This paper examines ways of taxing monopolistically competitive firms that pollute the environment. ...
Abstract This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. ...
International audienceThe choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed ...
We explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls as environmental policy instruments in a stoc...
This paper offers a new political economy explanation for the increasing use in recent years of quot...
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and p...
The paper examines the first-best use of instruments to control emissions in a non-competitive marke...
Abstract By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and there-fore the emission...
Under ideally competitive conditions, both controlling pollution by price (using a combined charge-s...
International audienceIn this paper, we consider competitive polluting firms that outsource their ab...
There is a tendency among policy-makers and industry lobbyists toward "specific", "relative" or "out...
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Productio...
In perfectly competitive markets taxes and quotas are fully equivalent measures for environmental pr...
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Productio...
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem where the regulator and poll...
This paper examines ways of taxing monopolistically competitive firms that pollute the environment. ...
Abstract This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. ...
International audienceThe choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed ...
We explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls as environmental policy instruments in a stoc...
This paper offers a new political economy explanation for the increasing use in recent years of quot...
We compare the effects of taxes and quotas for an environmental problem in which the regulator and p...
The paper examines the first-best use of instruments to control emissions in a non-competitive marke...
Abstract By exercising market power, a firm will distort the production, and there-fore the emission...
Under ideally competitive conditions, both controlling pollution by price (using a combined charge-s...
International audienceIn this paper, we consider competitive polluting firms that outsource their ab...
There is a tendency among policy-makers and industry lobbyists toward "specific", "relative" or "out...
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential entrant. Productio...
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