Moral hazard costs are estimated using a new crop insurance design approach. The simulation results show that incorporation of incentive compatibility constraints into insurance design can substantially reduce moral hazard costs
The impact of current Federal Crop Insurance Program has attracted interests and attention of many e...
Insuring against crop yield risk is an important task in rural microfinance because such an insuranc...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
A new crop insurance model based on just random risk (natural states) is presented instead of tradit...
Subject code: Risk and uncertainty Short Abstract, not more than 50 words. A new crop insurance mode...
In this paper we develop a theoretical model of input supply by agricultural producers who purchase ...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizeable effi...
The twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are often blamed for the lack of an active c...
A definition of moral hazard in multiple peril crop insurance is proposed that focuses on expected i...
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in c...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools...
The economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that, given full infor...
Crop insurance contracts typically constrain the choice of price at which indemnification occurs to ...
The impact of current Federal Crop Insurance Program has attracted interests and attention of many e...
Insuring against crop yield risk is an important task in rural microfinance because such an insuranc...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
A new crop insurance model based on just random risk (natural states) is presented instead of tradit...
Subject code: Risk and uncertainty Short Abstract, not more than 50 words. A new crop insurance mode...
In this paper we develop a theoretical model of input supply by agricultural producers who purchase ...
The main motivation for this paper is the recognition of the fact that asymmetric information is the...
Asymmetric information in the form of moral hazard and adverse selection can result in sizeable effi...
The twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are often blamed for the lack of an active c...
A definition of moral hazard in multiple peril crop insurance is proposed that focuses on expected i...
This paper employs a cost function analysis method to investigate the existence of moral hazard in c...
The asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazardcan cause insurance markets...
The Federal Crop Insurance Corporation provides one of the most widely adopted risk mitigation tools...
The economic theory of contracts is applied to agricultural insurance to show that, given full infor...
Crop insurance contracts typically constrain the choice of price at which indemnification occurs to ...
The impact of current Federal Crop Insurance Program has attracted interests and attention of many e...
Insuring against crop yield risk is an important task in rural microfinance because such an insuranc...
This paper examines whether the loadings on the crop insurance premium rates for risks such as moral...
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