A theoretical analysis of equilibrium contracts between risk neutral landlords and tenants when tenants' soil exploitation is non-contractible indicates that landlords will overinvest in conservation structures. An empirical model using farm-level data provides evidence that investment in contractible soil conservation measures is greater on rental land
This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We con...
This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long-standing issues: i...
Reverse share tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a comm...
A theoretical analysis of equilibrium contracts between risk neutral landlords and tenants when tena...
The equilibrium allocation of owner operated and rental land in the agricultural sector is examined ...
This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity i...
This paper provides new perspectives on USA landlord–tenant contracting, where technical change is c...
This paper addresses two issues: the relationship between the choice of rental contract in agricultu...
Abstract: This paper explores the role of a limited liability clause – which allows a tenant to fore...
Two issues in land tenure contracts in agriculture that have vexed economists are (1) the appearance...
Introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a Principal –Agent model of sharecropping...
Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a common phe...
This paper examines the rental rates that tenants can afford to pay given alternative price and yiel...
This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency...
Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a common phe...
This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We con...
This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long-standing issues: i...
Reverse share tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a comm...
A theoretical analysis of equilibrium contracts between risk neutral landlords and tenants when tena...
The equilibrium allocation of owner operated and rental land in the agricultural sector is examined ...
This paper presents a theoretical model to analyze the incentives for protecting soil productivity i...
This paper provides new perspectives on USA landlord–tenant contracting, where technical change is c...
This paper addresses two issues: the relationship between the choice of rental contract in agricultu...
Abstract: This paper explores the role of a limited liability clause – which allows a tenant to fore...
Two issues in land tenure contracts in agriculture that have vexed economists are (1) the appearance...
Introducing concerns about land fertility for landlords in a Principal –Agent model of sharecropping...
Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a common phe...
This paper examines the rental rates that tenants can afford to pay given alternative price and yiel...
This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency...
Reverse tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a common phe...
This paper presents an analysis of agricultural contracts using a transaction costs approach. We con...
This paper analyses the tenancy problem in a dynamic setup and addresses two long-standing issues: i...
Reverse share tenancy, wherein poorer landlords rent out land to richer tenants on shares, is a comm...
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