On the (lack of) usefulness of professional philosophy of science

This article investigates the lack of usefulness of professional philosophy of science, i.e. to which extent it fails to reach its objective (definitional) goals. In the first section, I recall what philosophy, and philosophy of science in particular, are supposed to deliver: what are their goals. In a second section, rather than providing an overview of how these goals are met or not, I mainly focus on some problematic cases where they are not met, in other words cases where philosophy of science is not useful. More precisely, I show how the skills necessary to philosophy can hinder consensus, and how an unrealistic picture of science can lead to descriptive and normative irrelevance, both of these situations leading to uselessness. I then argue for the need, for philosophy, to reflect upon its own values, an issue which is illustrated by the two previous ones, as well as by the issue of the choice of research avenues. This again has an impact on usefulness, but potentially a positive one. The conclusion summarises my claims and suggests a further avenue of improvement for philosophy of science : the assessment of the consequences of its practice