A model of repeated play of a coordination game, where stage games have a location in social space, and players receive noisy signals of the true location of their games, is reviewed. Sugden (1995) suggests that in such a model, there can be a stationary state of convention coexistence only if interaction is nonuniform across social space. This paper shows that an alternative definition of conventions, which links conventions to actions rather than expectations, permits convention coexistence when interaction is uniform. To assess robustness, the concept of a global mutant is introduced, to which certain states of coexistence are robust
Lewis (1969) characterises conventions as regularities that arise from recurrent coordination games....
We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled in...
The topics dealt with in this thesis are all part of the general problem of social consensus, namely...
A model of repeated play of a coordination game, where stage games have a location in social space, ...
In this paper we consider conventions as regularities in behavior which help to solve coordination p...
ABSTRACT: Lewis (1969) invented signaling games to show that meaning convention can arise simply fro...
In this paper we consider conventions as regularities in behavior which help to solve coordination p...
The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and c...
We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled in...
Abstract Problems of social coordination can be formalized as non-cooperative games with several equ...
AbstractWe define the notion of social conventions in a standard game-theoretic framework, and ident...
Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain con...
International audienceIn recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivat...
Social conventions govern countless behaviors all of us engage in every day, from how we greet each ...
In recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivated by the game-theoret...
Lewis (1969) characterises conventions as regularities that arise from recurrent coordination games....
We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled in...
The topics dealt with in this thesis are all part of the general problem of social consensus, namely...
A model of repeated play of a coordination game, where stage games have a location in social space, ...
In this paper we consider conventions as regularities in behavior which help to solve coordination p...
ABSTRACT: Lewis (1969) invented signaling games to show that meaning convention can arise simply fro...
In this paper we consider conventions as regularities in behavior which help to solve coordination p...
The scope of the paper is the literature that employs coordination games to study social norms and c...
We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled in...
Abstract Problems of social coordination can be formalized as non-cooperative games with several equ...
AbstractWe define the notion of social conventions in a standard game-theoretic framework, and ident...
Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain con...
International audienceIn recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivat...
Social conventions govern countless behaviors all of us engage in every day, from how we greet each ...
In recent years, there has been an increase in research on conventions motivated by the game-theoret...
Lewis (1969) characterises conventions as regularities that arise from recurrent coordination games....
We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled in...
The topics dealt with in this thesis are all part of the general problem of social consensus, namely...