The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support...
This paper analyzes the roles of corporate governance in bank defaults during the recent financial c...
Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depres...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...
The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and th...
We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentive...
We examine the impact of board structure, CEO power and other bank-specific factors on bank risk-tak...
Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis...
The market consensus during the financial crisis was that financial sector CEOs were engaged in exce...
This thesis highlights the importance of corporate governance in the banking industry and investigat...
This paper focuses on the effects of corporate governance on bank performance during the financial c...
Failures in governance, especially in regard to boards of directors, have been blamed for the 2007–2...
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation and risk in...
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period le...
[[abstract]]This study investigates how the political connections of government bank CEOs affected t...
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial in...
This paper analyzes the roles of corporate governance in bank defaults during the recent financial c...
Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depres...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...
The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and th...
We investigate whether bank performance during the credit crisis of 2008 is related to CEO incentive...
We examine the impact of board structure, CEO power and other bank-specific factors on bank risk-tak...
Bank executives’ compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis...
The market consensus during the financial crisis was that financial sector CEOs were engaged in exce...
This thesis highlights the importance of corporate governance in the banking industry and investigat...
This paper focuses on the effects of corporate governance on bank performance during the financial c...
Failures in governance, especially in regard to boards of directors, have been blamed for the 2007–2...
This paper studies the relation between CEOs' monetary incentives, financial regulation and risk in...
We analyze bank governance, share ownership, CEO compensation, and bank risk taking in the period le...
[[abstract]]This study investigates how the political connections of government bank CEOs affected t...
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial in...
This paper analyzes the roles of corporate governance in bank defaults during the recent financial c...
Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since the Great Depres...
The authors would like to thank the anonymous referee and Jim Peach of New Mexico State University f...