Ecumenical Expressivism: The Frege-Geach Problem and the Open Question Argument

U ovom radu se razmatra pozicija ekumenskog ekspresivizma, tj. metaetičke teorije prema kojoj moralni sudovi istovremeno izražavaju subjektov sentiment (ne) odobravanja objekata, postupaka i praksi koje instanciraju određena svojstva, kao i subjektovo verovanje da ti objekti, postupci i prakse instanciraju pomenuta svojstva. Nakon detaljnog prikaza centralnih postavki ove filozofske pozicije, analiziraćemo koliko uspešno ona može da otkloni pretnju koju ispostavlja modifikovana varijanta argumenta otvorenog pitanja, kao i to da li može da reši čuveni Frege-Gičov problem, koji se opravdano smatra najozbiljnijom preprekom za usvajanje bilo kog oblika ekspresivizma. Zaključak ove analize je da nije opravdana tvrdnja da ekumenski ekspresivizam možemo smatrati pozicijom koja je superiorna u odnosu na ne-ekumenske oblike ekspresivističkih i kognitivističkih gledišta, što nije slučaj i sa ekumenskim kognitivizmom.This paper examines the position of ecumenical expressivism, a metaethical theory according to which moral judgments simultaneously express an individual’s sentiment of (dis)approval towards objects, actions, and practices instantiating certain properties, as well as their belief that these objects, actions, and practices instantiate the mentioned properties. After a detailed exposition of the central tenets of this philosophical position, we will analyze how successfully it can address the threat posed by the modified version of the open-question argument and whether it can resolve the famous Frege-Geach problem, which is rightly considered the most serious obstacle to adopting any form of expressivism. The conclusion of this analysis is that the claim that ecumenical expressivism can be considered a superior position compared to non-ecumenical forms of expressivist and cognitivist views is unjustified. This contrasts with the case of ecumenical cognitivism, where such a claim finds stronger support