Unbalanced power relationship in digital markets between platforms and their complementors: can consumers come to the rescue?

Acknowledging the unbalanced power relationship between online platforms and their complementors, the economic dependence relationship and fear of retaliation may prevent complementors from fighting against economically harmful practices implemented by online dominant platforms. The economic dependence relationship and fear of retaliation are illustrated by past antitrust cases on both sides of the Atlantic. Having set the scene in which complementors might be disincentivised to take up legal actions facing anticompetitive practices, this paper takes the example of two distortions of information practices, implemented by dominant online platforms, that are harmful to both consumers and complementors: dark patterns and ranking biased by fake reviews. Under the angle of consumer empowerment (through direct complaints) and consumer-oriented enforcement (relying on competition law, the UCPD, and the Digital Services Act Package), this paper shows that consumer empowerment and consumer-oriented enforcement of distortion of information practices can produce a positive externality for complementors. Sole claims for damages have the lowest probability of producing a positive externality unless they act as a signal against an obligation non-implemented by an online platform. Injunctions and commitments have the highest probability of producing a positive externality for complementors. However, one of the constraints of this proposal may be the limited detectability of these practices by consumers