Add to ORKGGiven the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it provides simple tests for checking whether or not a social choice correspondence can be implemented. Their usefulness is shown by examining implementation in a wide variety of environments.25, 4 p
In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nas...
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”,...
In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nas...
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis o...
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis o...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest ” individuals...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the pres-ence of “partially honest ” individual...
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" ...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals....
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals....
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”,...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
This paper belongs to the recent literature which explores the consequence(s) of allowing some play...
In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nas...
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”,...
In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nas...
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis o...
Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis o...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of “partially honest ” individuals...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the pres-ence of “partially honest ” individual...
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to" ...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals....
We investigate the problem of Nash implementation in the presence of "partially honest" individuals....
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”,...
This paper studies implementation problems in the wake of a recent trend of implementation of non-co...
This paper belongs to the recent literature which explores the consequence(s) of allowing some play...
In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nas...
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, “Do not lie if you do not have to”,...
In a two-agent society with partially-honest agents, we extend Dutta and Sen (2009)'s results of Nas...