There have been heated debates on whether private health insurance creates moral hazard effects. Despite its importance, however, the moral hazard problem of private health insurance is still controversial and understudied. To empirically examine whether or not moral hazard exists in the Korean private health insurance market, we employed two-stage regression for endogeneity control and the Heckman two-step procedure for sample selection bias control, which are expected to produce consistent estimates. All estimation results do not allow us to detect the presence of the moral hazard effects and imply that people hold private health insurance simply as “safety net”
Moral hazard may arise when the hidden actions of an insured individual affect the probability distr...
This paper contributes to the discussion around ex-post (increased utilisation of health care) and e...
We use employee-level panel data from a single \u85rm to explore the possibility that individuals ma...
Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets and und...
Separating selection bias from moral hazard in private health insurance (PHI) markets has been a cha...
The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important pol...
The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an eff...
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may ...
We estimate the impact of private hospital insurance on utilization of hospital care services in Aus...
Empirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets has ...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...
Objectives To evaluate the presence of moral hazard, adjusted for the propensity to have self-purcha...
This history of moral hazard in health insurance shows that this concept is different from how moral...
Nearly all Koreans are insured through National Health Insurance(NHI). While NHI coverage is nearly ...
The Australian hospital system is characterized by the co-existence of private hospitals, where indi...
Moral hazard may arise when the hidden actions of an insured individual affect the probability distr...
This paper contributes to the discussion around ex-post (increased utilisation of health care) and e...
We use employee-level panel data from a single \u85rm to explore the possibility that individuals ma...
Moral hazard and adverse selection create inefficiencies in private health insurance markets and und...
Separating selection bias from moral hazard in private health insurance (PHI) markets has been a cha...
The size of adverse selection and moral hazard effects in health insurance markets has important pol...
The phenomenon of adverse selection (AS) and moral hazard (MH) are significant impediments to an eff...
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that individuals may ...
We estimate the impact of private hospital insurance on utilization of hospital care services in Aus...
Empirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance markets has ...
open3siEmpirically separating the phenomena of moral hazard and adverse selection in insurance marke...
Objectives To evaluate the presence of moral hazard, adjusted for the propensity to have self-purcha...
This history of moral hazard in health insurance shows that this concept is different from how moral...
Nearly all Koreans are insured through National Health Insurance(NHI). While NHI coverage is nearly ...
The Australian hospital system is characterized by the co-existence of private hospitals, where indi...
Moral hazard may arise when the hidden actions of an insured individual affect the probability distr...
This paper contributes to the discussion around ex-post (increased utilisation of health care) and e...
We use employee-level panel data from a single \u85rm to explore the possibility that individuals ma...