This paper presents the communication process of passionate belief messages according to a protocol, and then to show that, by communication among players, the posteriors for a given event must be equal among them even if they have asymmetric information. In our setting, the players may send non-partitional messages based on their beliefs. We show that players can obtain the same posteriors under the communication by such noisy information.19 p
In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson 1986) o...
International audienceParikh and Krasucki [R. Parikh, P. Krasucki, Communication, consensus and know...
We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players’ preference...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision mak-ers have different p...
I extend the results on communication, information and common knowledge by proving the following : 1...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different pr...
Error-correcting codes are efficient methods for handling noisy communication channels in the contex...
Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed that if rational agents communicate the value of a function f acco...
The present paper extends the standard model of pairwise communication among bayesian agents to case...
International audienceError-correcting codes are efficient methods for handling noisy communication ...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The purpose of this paper is to present the pre-play communication-process leading to a Nash equilib...
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where play-ers ’ optimal actio...
In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson 1986) o...
International audienceParikh and Krasucki [R. Parikh, P. Krasucki, Communication, consensus and know...
We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players’ preference...
We study a model of pairwise communication in a finite population of Bayesian agents. We show that, ...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision mak-ers have different p...
I extend the results on communication, information and common knowledge by proving the following : 1...
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different pr...
Error-correcting codes are efficient methods for handling noisy communication channels in the contex...
Parikh and Krasucki [1990] showed that if rational agents communicate the value of a function f acco...
The present paper extends the standard model of pairwise communication among bayesian agents to case...
International audienceError-correcting codes are efficient methods for handling noisy communication ...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The purpose of this paper is to present the pre-play communication-process leading to a Nash equilib...
We study strategic information transmission in a Sender-Receiver game where play-ers ’ optimal actio...
In this paper, we generalize the notion of a communication equilibrium (Forges 1986, Myerson 1986) o...
International audienceParikh and Krasucki [R. Parikh, P. Krasucki, Communication, consensus and know...
We analyze how communication and voting interact when there is uncertainty about players’ preference...