It is widely recognized that the degree of inefficiency in the voluntary provision of a public good increases with the group size of an economy. However, we find that only a slight modification in the conventional assumptions gives rise to a profound difference in outcome. In particular, we show that there is a case where the Nash equilibrium provision and the efficient provision will converge as the size of an economy grows. To show this we assume individuals face increasing marginal cost of voluntary provision and their preference function has a finite satiety point
We consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
Are larger groups better at cooperation than smaller groups? This paper investigates, under controll...
It is widely recognized that the degree of inefficiency in the voluntary provision of a public good ...
We consider a quasi-linear economy with satiation points for the public good which can be different ...
This paper investigates voluntary public goods provision in a dynamic economy, where individuals can...
Abstract Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form outputsharing grou...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about t...
This paper shows that the public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grou...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analyzed in the context of a two-stage game in whic...
This paper analyzes the impact of a group-size change on contributing incentives in repeated provis...
We consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
Are larger groups better at cooperation than smaller groups? This paper investigates, under controll...
It is widely recognized that the degree of inefficiency in the voluntary provision of a public good ...
We consider a quasi-linear economy with satiation points for the public good which can be different ...
This paper investigates voluntary public goods provision in a dynamic economy, where individuals can...
Abstract Individuals extracting common-pool resources in the field sometimes form outputsharing grou...
This paper presents a model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have ...
This dissertation examines the Nash equilibrium in giving by private individuals when the gifts are ...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
We examine the strategy-proof provision of excludable public goods when agents care not only about t...
This paper shows that the public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grou...
We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assum...
The non-cooperative provision of public goods is analyzed in the context of a two-stage game in whic...
This paper analyzes the impact of a group-size change on contributing incentives in repeated provis...
We consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary...
We show that when individuals can save (accumulate capital), they all eventually become public-good ...
Are larger groups better at cooperation than smaller groups? This paper investigates, under controll...