Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade policy. At the beginning of the games, the domestic and foreign governments choose whether to set trade policy at stage one or two. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium of both games, the domestic government will set its tariff (and production subsidy) at stage one and the foreign government its export subsidy at stage two. The domestic country commits not to use a countervailing duty in both games, and both countries are better off than when they set trade policy simultaneously
In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic e...
In this technical paper, the analysis of Ohkawa, Okamura, and Tawada (2002) is reconsid-ered. The pa...
A two-period simultaneous signalling model is developed in which first period outputs not only signa...
Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade polic...
Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade polic...
Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade pol...
This paper analyzes various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context of nonco...
This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commit...
This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commit...
This paper examines a trade policy game with endogenous timing. A tradeoff between commitment and fl...
Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether the...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit shifting argument for export subsidies. Trade...
This paper examines how the timing of decision-making affects the strategic trade policy. Extending ...
This paper examines how the timing of decision-making affects strategic trade policy. In this paper,...
With industry lobby groups and optimizing politicians, I have derived trade policies endogenously fo...
In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic e...
In this technical paper, the analysis of Ohkawa, Okamura, and Tawada (2002) is reconsid-ered. The pa...
A two-period simultaneous signalling model is developed in which first period outputs not only signa...
Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade polic...
Endogenous Timing in Trade Policy Games: Should Governments Use Countervailing Duties? - Trade polic...
Trade policy under oligopoly is analysed in two multistage games with endogenous timing of trade pol...
This paper analyzes various equilibria associated with intervention in trade in the context of nonco...
This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commit...
This paper examines a strategic trade policy game with endogenous timing. A trade-off between commit...
This paper examines a trade policy game with endogenous timing. A tradeoff between commitment and fl...
Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether the...
This paper analyses how retaliation affects the profit shifting argument for export subsidies. Trade...
This paper examines how the timing of decision-making affects the strategic trade policy. Extending ...
This paper examines how the timing of decision-making affects strategic trade policy. In this paper,...
With industry lobby groups and optimizing politicians, I have derived trade policies endogenously fo...
In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic e...
In this technical paper, the analysis of Ohkawa, Okamura, and Tawada (2002) is reconsid-ered. The pa...
A two-period simultaneous signalling model is developed in which first period outputs not only signa...