In a local interaction game agents play an identical stage game against their neighbours over time. For nearest neighbour interaction, it is established that, starting from a random initial configuration in which each agent has a positive probability of playing the risk dominant strategy, a sufficiently large population coordinates in the long-run on the risk dominant equilibrium almost surely. Our result improves on Blume (1995), Ellison (2000), and Morris (2000) by showing that the risk dominant equilibrium spreads to the entire population in a two dimensional lattice and without the help of mutation, as long as there is some randomness in the initial configuration
<p>We consider a homogeneous population of size . Once a mutation occurs, the mutant strategy either...
We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interaction...
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundan...
In a local interaction game agents play an identical stage game against their neighbours over time. ...
A local interaction game is a game where agents play an identical stage game against their neighbors...
Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely sele...
Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely sele...
Recent stochastic evolutionary models have shown that the most likely convention when the probabilit...
We examine distribution of strategies in demographic Donor-Recipient game where patterns of move-pla...
This paper considers the equilibrium selection problem in coordination games when players interact o...
This work presents a systematic study of population games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and...
<div><p>Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally like...
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e....
Abstract We study the problem of spreading a particular behavior among agents located in a random so...
This paper adds to the growing literature on stochastic evolutionary models. These models can be cha...
<p>We consider a homogeneous population of size . Once a mutation occurs, the mutant strategy either...
We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interaction...
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundan...
In a local interaction game agents play an identical stage game against their neighbours over time. ...
A local interaction game is a game where agents play an identical stage game against their neighbors...
Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely sele...
Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely sele...
Recent stochastic evolutionary models have shown that the most likely convention when the probabilit...
We examine distribution of strategies in demographic Donor-Recipient game where patterns of move-pla...
This paper considers the equilibrium selection problem in coordination games when players interact o...
This work presents a systematic study of population games of the Prisoner's Dilemma, Hawk-Dove, and...
<div><p>Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally like...
Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations assumes that all mutations are equally likely, i.e....
Abstract We study the problem of spreading a particular behavior among agents located in a random so...
This paper adds to the growing literature on stochastic evolutionary models. These models can be cha...
<p>We consider a homogeneous population of size . Once a mutation occurs, the mutant strategy either...
We study evolutionary dynamics in a population of individuals engaged in pairwise social interaction...
In evolutionary games the fitness of individuals is not constant but depends on the relative abundan...