Is a typology of dialogical selves a viable proposition?

This paper considers the feasibility of integrating Hermans’s Dialogical Self Theory (DST) and Beebe’s Typology as Qualified by Archetypes (TQA), which extends Jungian psychological types theory. Similarities between some aspects of dialogical-self and Jungian perspectives have been noted by both Hermans (1993) and Beebe (2002). Yet, insofar as the innovation of DST lies in the postulation of highly idiographic indefinite number of personal I-positions, it might seem incommensurable with notions of typologies. The challenge is to demonstrate that the core postulation of a dialogical self is not compromised by “grafting” a typology onto it. A first step towards meeting this challenge is attention to the assumption of universals already built into DST, such as Self/Other motives and positive/negative affect. Drawing upon Jung’s theory of autonomous complexes, among other concepts, the TQA differentiates among intrapersonal states that alternately underlie anyone’s phenomenological attunement. This complements DST by allowing us to delineate modes of consciousness that channel actual experiences into a plethora of idiographic Ipositions which would have emerged in the course of personal development. Posing the question of a conceptual integration may open up spaces for formulating research questions and exploring practical applications