We present and conduct a novel experiment on a dynamic beauty contest game motivated by the canonical New-Keynesian model. Participants continuously provide forecasts for prices spanning multiple future periods. These forecasts determine the price for the current period and participants’ payoffs. Our findings are threefold. First, the observed prices in the experiment deviate more from the rational expectations equilibrium prices under strategic complementarity than under strategic substitution. Second, participants’ expectations respond to announcements of future shocks on average. Finally, participants employ heuristics in their forecasting; however, the choice of heuristic varies with the degree of strategic complementarity
The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeco...
The weight assigned to public information in Keynesian beauty contest depends on the signal precisio...
Which strategies do agents use when forming expectations about future prices, and how often do combi...
In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and...
International audienceIn Keynes’ beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected...
Revised, first published as “"Speculation rather than enterprise? Keynes’ beauty contest revisited i...
In Keynes' beauty contest, agents have to choose actions in accordance with an expected fundamental ...
Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly morefrom the Nas...
The beauty contest stems from Keyne's famous book where he uses a baeuty contest game to illust...
The authors report and compare results from several different versions of an experimental interactiv...
In interactions under strategic complementarity, naive players have a disproportionally large effect...
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct...
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct...
We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players' actio...
The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeco...
The weight assigned to public information in Keynesian beauty contest depends on the signal precisio...
Which strategies do agents use when forming expectations about future prices, and how often do combi...
In Keynes' beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected fundamental value and...
International audienceIn Keynes’ beauty contest, agents make evaluations reflecting both an expected...
Revised, first published as “"Speculation rather than enterprise? Keynes’ beauty contest revisited i...
In Keynes' beauty contest, agents have to choose actions in accordance with an expected fundamental ...
Recent experimental studies have shown that observed outcomes deviate significantly morefrom the Nas...
The beauty contest stems from Keyne's famous book where he uses a baeuty contest game to illust...
The authors report and compare results from several different versions of an experimental interactiv...
In interactions under strategic complementarity, naive players have a disproportionally large effect...
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct...
This paper provides new evidence on the formation and anchoring of inflation expectations. I conduct...
We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players' actio...
The great recession (2008) triggered an apparent discrepancy between empirical findings and macroeco...
The weight assigned to public information in Keynesian beauty contest depends on the signal precisio...
Which strategies do agents use when forming expectations about future prices, and how often do combi...