How Have We Always Been Posthuman?

Rad problematizuje opravdanost „postističkih“ revizija humanizma. U prvom delu rada izlaže se ona misaona linija razumevanja čoveka koja čoveka vidi kao hronično manjkavog za vlastitu „prirodu“ ili „suštinu“ i koja od te neukorenjenosti gradi njegov privilegovan status. Drugi deo rada posvećen je odnosu transhumanizma i kritičkog posthumanizma prema humanizmu. Nalazi se da transhumanizam skladno nastavlja i/ili radikalizuje humanistički projekt samotvoračkog i samotranscendirajućeg čoveka, dok kritički posthumanizam radije zagovara ponovno promišljanje i redeskripiciju čoveka s obzirom na ono što smatra da su bile pogubne posledice humanizma. Zaključni deo rada detektuje izvesnu proizvoljnost u razumevanju humanizma njegovih kritičara, podseća da su se i unutar humanizma baštinili kritički momenti kao njegov vlastiti sadržaj i korektiv, te da su možda suvišne objave radikalnih rezova i raskida sa humanističkom tradicijom. Sugeriše se jedno sinoptičko sagledavanje humanističkih orijentira i njihovih posthumanističkih osuda, koje bi uvažilo i baštinu humanističke misli i obavezu njenog kritičkog preispitivanja.This paper problematises the justification of ‘postist’ revisions of humanism. In the first part of the paper, a line of thought that persistently marks the self-perception of man is presented. It stretches from Plato, through Pico della Mirandola and Kant, all the way to existentialism and philosophical anthropology in the twentieth century. In it, man is understood as chronically deficient in their own ‘nature’ or ‘essence’, and his privileged status is built from this rootlessness. The second part of the paper is dedicated to the relationship of transhumanism and critical posthumanism to humanism. Transhumanism is found to harmoniously continue and/or radicalise the humanist project of self-creating and self-transcending man, while critical posthumanism advocates a rethinking and redescription of man in view of what are considered to have been the disastrous consequences of humanism: a transgression in relation to everything different from man by anthropomorphising it and anthropocentrically measuring it against himself. The concluding part of the paper detects a certain arbitrariness in the understanding of humanism by its critics, reminds that even within such a broadly understood humanism, critical moments have been inherited as its own content and corrective, and that announcements of radical cuts and ruptures with the humanistic tradition are perhaps redundant. It is also noted that something non-negligible has changed with the contemporary challenges of technoscience – artificial intelligence, informatics, robotics –but it is contested that this change in social history requires a cardinal rejection, change or neglect of the intellectual heritage that enables responses to it and/or a rational dispute about it. A synoptic overview of humanist landmarks and their post-humanist condemnations is suggested, which would respect the heritage of humanist thought and the right or even the obligation built into it of its critical reviewL’article problématise le bien-fondé des révisions « postistes » de l’humanisme. Dans la première partie de ce travail est exposée cette ligne de pensée qui conçoit l’homme comme chroniquement incomplet dans sa propre « nature » ou « essence » et qui de ce déracinement construit son statut privilégié. La deuxième partie de ce travail est consacrée au rapport du transhumanisme et du posthumanisme critique envers l’humanisme. Il est démontré que le transhumanisme continue et/ou radicalise harmonieusement le projet humaniste de l’homme autocréateur et autotranscendant, alors que le transhumanisme critique préfère opter pour le réexamen et la redescription de l’homme étant donné ce qu’il considère comme les conséquences néfastes de l’humanisme. La partie conclusive de l’article détecte un certain arbitraire dans la compréhension de l’humanisme de la part de ses critiques, rappelle qu’à l’intérieur de l’humanisme s’étaient aussi développés des éléments critiques qui faisaient partie de son propre contenu et de son correctif, enfin que les annonces des séparations et ruptures radicales avec la tradition humaniste sont peut-être superflues. Il est suggéré qu’une analyse synoptique des repères humanistes et de leurs condamnations posthumanistes, prendrait en compte et le patrimoine de la pensée humaniste et l’obligation de son réexamen critiqu