An Empirical and Theoretical Study on Emission Permits

Market-based measures are currently very popular among policy makers. In a system for marketable permits, relevant companies exchange permits on the theory that trading creates economic incentives that encourage firms to minimize the costs to society of pollution control. The chief appeal of economic incentives as the regulatory device for achieving environmental standards is the potentially large cost-saving that they promise. The source of these cost savings is the capacity of economic instruments to take advantage of the large differentials abatement costs across polluters, as formally proved by [74]. In chapter 2, we review fundamental concepts in environmental economics and survey the main theoretical results regarding the use of emission permits. In an effort to bridge the gap between theory and observed market-price behavior, in chapter 3 we investigate the historical time series of the SO2 and CO2 emission permits price in the U.S. market and in the EU ETS, respectively. More precisely, we advocate the use of a new GARCH-type structure for the analysis of the returns of the permit price and demonstrate its effectiveness in terms of model fit and out-of-sample value-at-risk forecasting. Taking into account the most important features of the EU ETS, in chapter 4 we provide a simple conceptual framework and develop an equilibrium model for the price of the emission permits. This chapter is similar in spirit to [44] and [91] - two papers developed in parallel to our work. Unlike these two, this chapter gives insights into the dynamics of the CO2 permit price for a finite time horizon in presence of asymmetric information. In particular, the obtained equilibrium price for emission reflects the scarcity or excess of permits in the market. Finally, we introduce a CO2-option pricing model comparison. The comparison is carried out between the conventional Black, Merton and Scholes model and our equilibrium model. In the final chapter of the thesis, chapter 5, we evaluate when it is optimal to undertake a reversible investment to reduce noxious emissions or trading permits. In other words, we evaluate the price-level at which trading permits is a cheaper solution. In particular, I derive in analytic form the premium for the flexibility embedded in emission permits, extending the works of [22] and [5]. This preliminary result explains the different behavior of the premium for the flexibility of emission permits under both reversible and irreversible investment. Such a result has also extremely interesting and practical relevance for policy makers, as discussed in the chapter