Far-Right Voters' Profiles: A Case Study of Elections in Sweden, Italy and Poland

Ovaj rad ima za cilj opisati biračke profile radikala u Europi, točnije u Švedskoj, Poljskoj i Italiji, te ih usporediti s glasačima drugih stranaka u njihovim zemljama. Takvo istraživanje može nam pružiti značajan uvid u biračke preferencije birača radikalne desnice u Europi, ponajprije u njihove političke preferencije i medijske navike. Ovo istraživanje također nam može pomoći da saznamo više o demografskim karakteristikama ovih glasača. Jedna od ključnih točaka ovog istraživanja je izmjeriti i usporediti razine povjerenja koje birači radikalne desnice imaju u tradicionalne medije i političke institucije. Kako bi se došlo do ovih informacija, podaci iz European Value Survey i European Social Survey analizirani su putem programa za analizu podataka SPSS. Nalazi rada pokazuju da su birači radikalne desnice obično u prosjeku stariji od birača drugih stranaka, kao i da su najčešće manje obrazovani, skloniji su vjerovanju u teorije zavjere i manje vjeruju tradicionalnim medijima i političkim institucijama. Ova otkrića mogu, ali i ne moraju, ukazivati na koherentnost između post truth društva i uspona radikalne desnice u Europi.This paper aims to describe the voter profiles of the radical in Europe, precisely in Sweden, Poland and Italy, and compare them to voters of other parties in their respective countries. Such research can provide us with a significant insight into the voter preferences of the radical right voters in Europe, mainly their political preferences and their media habits. This research can also help us learn more about the demographic characteristics of these voters. One of the key points of this research is to measure and compare the levels of trust that the voters of the radical right hold for traditional media and established political institutions. In order to reach this information, data from European Value Survey and European Social Survey was analzyed via a data analysis program SPSS. The findings of the paper indicate that the voters of the radical right are usually older in average compared to the voters of other parties, as well as that they are commonly less educated, more likely to believe in conspiracy theories and less likely to trust traditional media and political institutions. These findings may or may not indicate a coherence between post truth society and the rise of radical right in Europe