Ethical Naturalism and Conceptual Analysis

出版社版lt is thought that ethical natural is one of the most influential theories of meta-ethics. But we cannot say that ethical naturalists have succeeded in the analyses of moral concepts. On the one hand, semantical naturalism has been prey G.E.Moore's open question argument(OQA)． Semantical naturalism claims that 'good'means the same as 'pleasant', but Moore's OQA exposes its naturalistic fallacy.Ontological naturalism, on the other hand, does not commit itself to the synonymy of moral and non-moral words.But even then,ontological naturalism cannot divert OQA.The story of ontological naturalism includes the a priori part and its a priori part is the target of OQA. In any case, ethical naturalists has been poor at conceptual analysis. But the situation has changed recently. Ethical naturalists realize that they cannot shelve the problem of conceptual analysis. Both F.Jackson and M.Smith commit themselves to ethical naturalism and take the problem of conceptual analysis seriously.Moral and non-moral concepts are related to each other and they form the tight-knit network. Jackson attempts the explicit and reductive style analyses of the network by appealing to Ramseyfication, while Smith tries the summary-style, non-reductive anaIyses. It is true that their philosophical attempts are instructive, but they do not succeed in reinforcing ethical naturalism. Rather,contrary to their expectations,they bring to light the trouble ethical naturalism.The lesson to be learned is that we should try non-naturalistic conceptual analysis in the spirit of moral particularism