This study investigates whether the large payouts that are available to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) from a change in corporate control (takeover) do motivate some CEOs to seek acquisition of their firms by making them more attractive to a takeover bid. Using Australian and the US data, employing OLS regression, we report that there is a significant relationship between a CEOs change in control payments and their firm’s net cash levels (one of the key factors of takeover attractiveness). Our empirical results also indicate that CEOs desire their firms to be acquired by decreasing shareholders’ equity, thus supporting the view that change in control payments exist primarily for incumbent managers. Our findings provide support to the propo...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from ...
We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO’s incentives to pursue a merger....
This study investigates whether the large payouts that are available to Chief Executive Officers (CE...
This study investigates whether the large payouts that are available to Chief Executive Officers (CE...
Corporate takeovers are major investments that present managers with opportunities that can exacerba...
Purpose This paper investigates the influence of tournament incentives, measured by Chief Executive...
Chief Executive Offier (CEO) characteristics, such as the level of risk aversion, are known to affec...
Using a sample of 2198 completed M&A transactions between 1994 and 2010 in which both target and acq...
We study if a CEO’s equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers. Wh...
This paper contributes to our understanding of managers' motivations for initiating the sale of thei...
While existing research addresses the presence of golden parachutes, it overlooks their relative imp...
Two models that attempt to explain the adoption of golden parachutes are examined. The first model v...
This paper contributes to our understanding of managers' motivations for initiating the sale of thei...
Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogen...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from ...
We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO’s incentives to pursue a merger....
This study investigates whether the large payouts that are available to Chief Executive Officers (CE...
This study investigates whether the large payouts that are available to Chief Executive Officers (CE...
Corporate takeovers are major investments that present managers with opportunities that can exacerba...
Purpose This paper investigates the influence of tournament incentives, measured by Chief Executive...
Chief Executive Offier (CEO) characteristics, such as the level of risk aversion, are known to affec...
Using a sample of 2198 completed M&A transactions between 1994 and 2010 in which both target and acq...
We study if a CEO’s equity-based compensation affects the expected value generation in takeovers. Wh...
This paper contributes to our understanding of managers' motivations for initiating the sale of thei...
While existing research addresses the presence of golden parachutes, it overlooks their relative imp...
Two models that attempt to explain the adoption of golden parachutes are examined. The first model v...
This paper contributes to our understanding of managers' motivations for initiating the sale of thei...
Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogen...
We study benefits received by target company CEOs in completed mergers and acquisitions. These execu...
In acquisitions, target chief executive officers (CEOs) face a moral hazard: Any personal gain from ...
We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO’s incentives to pursue a merger....