On the Possibility of Leibnizian Optimism in Our Time : Toward the Theodicy in the Future

In the era Voltaire criticized Leibnizian optimism and Rousseau defended it on the occasion of the disaster of Lisbon, the theological thought that God chose and created the best of all the possible worlds certainly deserved criticizing or defending. However, after Auschwitz had made the idea of theodicy completely futile, as Levinas put it, could it be of any use to discuss the significance of Leibnizian optimism in our time? In reality the question that should be raised is rather why catastrophic disasters never fail to recall some kind of theodicies even among people who don' t seem to believe in God any longer. Like other theodicies in general, Leibnizian theodicy had the theoretical functions to relieve people of their intolerable evils and pains, so its substitutes must have been indispensable ever since theodicy in a strict sense lost its validity. As a result, various forms of theodicies in a broader sense that appeared through their modern history, which can be characterized by the "humanization of theodicy" and then by the "naturalization of evils" , have now transformed into handy tools of justification and remission largely accompanied by Panglossian optimism. Today, living after Fukushima, we need new theodicy and another optimism, whether we still believe in God or not. My point is that the metaphysical system of Leibniz can offer an effective model of ontology and ethics we are forced to adopt under our current predicaments. In particular, the idea of "re-moralization of evils" by sharing them in common with our monadological relations would be essential for us to realize Leibnizian optimism in its original sense, which will never forget our obligations to others and toward the future