Can a Child Choose Death? Childist Ethics in Light of Terminal Illness and Euthanasia

In this dissertation, I explore the issue of euthanasia in light of the theological ethics of children. This project begins with a consideration of who children are, since children with life-limiting illness and disability are first and foremost human beings, little people living in the world. I look to theology of children, child ethics, disability and feminist theory, philosophy, theological ethics, and bioethics to form a broader consideration of end-of-life decision-making and child euthanasia in light of what it means for children to be subjects and moral agents. In this dissertation, I argue that that in the same way children do not live a humanity separate from that of adults but are fully human, so too children participate in the same moral worlds as members of human communities even before they are aware that these communities (or morality) exist. In other words, children are moral agents. This agency is grounded in their ability to make meaning, to act, to imitate, to use language creatively, to grasp a plurality of meaning, to reach judgments, to contribute to the meaning of others, and to shape their understanding, grounded in intersubjective subjectivity, and grounded in a particular story: where subjectivity, agency, and wholeness is found in the Trinitarian God in whose image we are made. In light of this, I will argue that children can die a good death, and that they can and should have a voice in their end of life care; we ought to be honest with them and include them in decision-making. They can make real and meaningful choices around death. But to include children as moral agents requires changing how we understand moral agency and personhood, which in turn undermines the liberal, individualistic, autonomous premises of arguments for euthanasia.Doctor of Philosophy (PhD