The Politics of Skepticism: Montaigne and Zhuangzi on Freedom, Toleration, and the Limits of Government

Contemporary political discourse often centers on a shared set of normative commitments: freedom, toleration, and limited government. This dissertation examines the theoretical basis for these commitments, through a comparative study of two eminent skeptics: Michel de Montaigne and Zhuangzi. Both develop forms of skepticism that are rooted in analyses of the phenomena of diversity and disagreement. They contend that our inability to reach convergence on central philosophical questions demonstrates the fundamental limitations of human knowledge. I argue that both offer novel and powerful arguments connecting these skeptical epistemological theses with the relevant normative commitments. In particular, both take skepticism to advance human freedom, by clearing away obstacles to effective action. As beings who are raised within a particular community, we inevitably acquire certain habits that constrain the forms of thought and action open to us. Skepticism helps us to recognize the contingency of those forms. In the interpersonal realm, both writers contend that skepticism generates an attitude of toleration towards others who live differently. This is because it undermines the theoretical claims upon which most forms of intolerance are constructed. I defend this claim with reference to the various forms of intolerance that existed in each writer’s context, Warring States era China and France during the Wars of Religion. Later chapters examine the political implications of these forms of skepticism. I argue that both writers suggest that skepticism helps to eliminate potentially dangerous political passions, notably personal ambition and the desire for glory. This leads to a more constrained view of government that encourages us to focus our attention on avoiding extreme cruelty and violence rather than pursuing grand political projects.Ph.D