Add to ORKG[This item is a preserved copy. To view the original, visit http://econtheory.org/] We prove that any regular ESS is asymptotically stable under any impartial pairwise comparison dynamic, including the Smith dynamic; under any separable excess payoff dynamic, including the BNN dynamic; and under the best response dynamic. Combined with existing results for imitative dynamics, our analysis validates the use of ESS as a blanket sufficient condition for local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) a...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
In this paper we show that there are certain limits as to what applications of Maynard Smith’s conce...
We consider the stability of strict equilibrium under deterministic evolutionary game dynamics. We s...
As is well known, equilibrium analysis of evolutionary partnership games can be done by studying a s...
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following require...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
This paper provides definitions for the evolutionary stability of sets of strategies based on simple...
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of n...
Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introd...
Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals and spe...
A system of n asexual populations is considered where both intra- and interspecific frequency-depend...
Abstract—Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been widely adopted in various research fields and recen...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) a...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...
In this paper we show that there are certain limits as to what applications of Maynard Smith’s conce...
We consider the stability of strict equilibrium under deterministic evolutionary game dynamics. We s...
As is well known, equilibrium analysis of evolutionary partnership games can be done by studying a s...
We introduce notions of evolutionary stability for sets of strategies based on the following require...
International audienceWe review some classical definitions and results concerning Evolutionarily Sta...
Allowing for games with a continuous action space, we investigate how evolutionary stability, the ex...
This paper provides definitions for the evolutionary stability of sets of strategies based on simple...
The concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is a useful tool for studying the dynamics of n...
Most existing results of evolutionary games restrict only to the Nash equilibrium. This paper introd...
Evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) are often used to explain the behaviors of individuals and spe...
A system of n asexual populations is considered where both intra- and interspecific frequency-depend...
Abstract—Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been widely adopted in various research fields and recen...
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain ...
We present two new notions of evolutionary stability, the truly evolutionarily stable state (TESS) a...
It is well established for evolutionary dynamics in asymmetric games that a pure strategy combinatio...