A state of one's own, self-determination and the legal discourse of identity

grantor: University of TorontoThis thesis argues that the right to self-determination as presently understood in international law is unsupportable in theory and unattainable in practice. It suggests that much of the current confusion surrounding the right stems from the flawed belief that it possesses a core of settled meaning, and that accordingly it is capable of being accommodated within the existing normative framework of international law. This thesis argues, however, that such accommodation simply is not possible because self-determination is fundamentally about identity, about the 'self'. It examines three competing and contradictory conceptions of the 'self'--the population of a sovereign state, the nation and the individual--and argues that none can claim to be the exclusive or authentic 'self', because identity, multiple and shifting, does not admit of stable and uncontested definition. This thesis suggests ultimately, that self-determination should be conceptualized, not as a right but as a discourse.LL.M