The physicality of mind and the problem of free will

grantor: University of TorontoIt is my thesis that a person who is convinced of possessing unequivocal freedom of will has indeed underestimated the extent to which psychic determinism governs human mental life. Free will of this kind would be conceptually plausible if and only if mind is disengaged from body. I aim to introduce more order and explicitness than at present exists into mind body analyses and the problem of free will. My aim determines my material, which is primarily concepts and their referents. My method is chiefly meta-psychophilosophical scrutiny and the ordering of concepts. Although I will primarily be concerned with the evolution of ideas regarding mental causality, consideration of the antitheses mind body, unconscious-conscious, free will-determinism is unavoidable. It will make for easier discussion to begin by contrasting and comparing these concepts with one another. My intent is to mitigate the tensions amongst various conceptions of mind and body within the larger conceptual framework of causality.M.A