The politics of Canada's nuclear policy, 1957-1963

grantor: University of TorontoScholars have portrayed John G. Diefenbaker as an indecisive leader who procrastinated over whether to accept nuclear weapons for Canada. However, it is an inadequate characterisation because it explains little about his behaviour. This dissertation seeks to explain why Diefenbaker was reluctant, but willing, to accept nuclear warheads. It argues that electoral considerations, not national security, governed his formulation of nuclear policy from 1957 to 1963. Concerns about electoral expediency meant that two things governed his formulation of policy: the state of public support and the position of parliamentary opposition. This was a period of transition for protest groups in Canada as organisations moved from protest to more extensive efforts to influence government policy, something anti-nuclear organisations exemplified. This dissertation traces the origins and activities of Canada's three most prominent anti-nuclear organisations: the Canadian Committee for the Control of Radiation Hazards, the Combined Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and the Voice of Women. How these organisations tried to convince Diefenbaker that they represented the views of the majority and why they failed are major elements of this thesis. Diefenbaker also worried about parliamentary opposition. Lester B. Pearson was particularly important in this regard. The Liberal leader's Nobel peace prize gave him added credibility when it came to matters of peace, and the prize and Pearson's repeated reference to it on the campaign trails only added to Diefenbaker's fears that the issue would be used by the Liberals for political gain. Despite these very real considerations, Diefenbaker was solely to blame for the political difficulties he faced on this issue. Had he moved forward decisively, he would have preceded the rise of the anti-nuclear movement. If he had accepted nuclear weapons in the early days of his majority mandate there would have been little opportunity for political opponents to criticise the government for indecision or inaction. Ultimately, Diefenbaker's fixation on electoral support turned out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.Ph.D