Liberalism, differential rights and the value of community

grantor: University of TorontoA major preoccupation of late twentieth century political theory is the challenge, posed by the politics of difference, that liberal justice fails to respond to problems faced by minority groups in contemporary liberal societies. This dissertation looks at how liberal justice can respond to this challenge. It is possible to isolate three main considerations which motivate the difference theorists' concern for minority groups: autonomy, identity, and equality. Part One focuses on considerations of identity and autonomy; Part Two addresses issues that arise in relation to equality. Considerations of autonomy and identity lead us in different directions. In Part One, I argue that the autonomy approach privileges the personal component of identity--how we define ourselves both in opposition and in relation to others. The identity approach privileges the social aspect of identity--what it means to belong to a group and to share its goals and values. I argue that these two aspects of identity are in fact inextricably linked. It is only by attending to both components of identity that we can appreciate the value of group membership with respect to individual identity. If we agree that group membership is essential to identity, it remains to be seen what claims are justified by this interest. Part Two develops an account of which groups matter to individual development. I identify community as the primary locus of individual development. I argue that community maps on to national minorities, ethnic groups, and many other non-ethnic communities. I discuss what claims might be generated by membership in these groups and consider what it means to ensure that people are treated equally with respect to the good of community membership. Addressing these claims requires differential rights, such as self-government and accommodation rights. These rights are motivated by demands for external protections and internal restrictions, which are interrogated in light of the identity approach developed in Part One. My approach allows us to reconcile some internal restrictions with the individual's freedom to develop her identity and disarms the objection to the Identity approach that it subsumes the individual's identity within the group identity.Ph.D