Planning Like a State: Railway Modernization in China

Railroads in China represent something special. As China enters the third decade of the 21st century, one of its hallmark achievements has been the remarkable modernization of its railway system. However, post-1949 sectoral modernization did not occur in a linear fashion. The Party-state failed to develop this critical sector, both during the 27 years of the Mao era (1949 to 1976) and the first 25 years of Deng’s reform and opening (1978 to 2002). China’s railway dream—sustained rapid development—only took off in the early 2000s. Against such a backdrop, my research questions are as follows: 1) Why did China’s railway dream only take off in the early 2000s, despite five decades of centralized Party rule? 2) What were the obstacles to sectoral modernization, and how were they finally overcome? 3) What political and economic factors, both internal and external, most decisively shaped the evolution of China’s railway system? 4) Finally, what do the distinctive patterns of railway development tell us about the broader political economy of industrial development in China? This dissertation argues that the practice of “concentrating powers to accomplish big things” was the principal reason behind sustained rapid modernization, and China’s accession to the World Trade Organization provided the crucial catalyst. I define “power concentration” as an institutionalized and centralized means of shaping and supporting a particular approach to sectoral development in order to meet the broader developmental challenges of the time. Power concentration manifested as the alignment of a clear developmental approach, professionalized and institutionalized macro-economic planning agencies and strategic industrial policies with restrictive targets that focus on overall planning and top-level design. In the absence of such policy guidance and environment, railway development was meagre as during the Mao era and early periods of reform and opening.Ph.D