Stability in One-Sided Matching Markets

The original publication is available at www.springerlink.comIn the context of coalition formation games a player evaluates a partition on the basis f the set she belongs to. For this evaluation to be possible, player are supposed to have preferences over sets to which they could belong. In this paper, we suggest two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets. For the first one, derived from the most preferred member of a set, it is shown that a strict core partition always exists if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for the computation of one strict core partitiion is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least preferred member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roommates problem.The work of Katarína Cechlárová was supported by the Slovak Grant Agency for Science under contract "Combinatorial structures and Complexity of Algorithms"Publicad