In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization of the welfare egalitarian correspondence in terms of three axioms: Pareto optimality, symmetry, and solidarity. This last property requires that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public goods of some of the agents should not decrease the welfare of any of them.Publicad
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies wi...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
mura and Yves Sprumont for helpful comments. This paper investigates extensions of the two fundament...
In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstr...
In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
Welfare theorems are concerned with the conditions under which decentralized decision making can lea...
Many normatively oriented economists, legal academics and other policy analysts appear to be welfar...
A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public pro...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival g...
First Version: September 2001; This Version: January 2002This paper investigates extensions of the t...
This dissertation studies strategic social influence in the presence of a self-control problem and e...
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies wi...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
In economies with public goods, and agents with quasi-linear preferences, we give a characterization...
mura and Yves Sprumont for helpful comments. This paper investigates extensions of the two fundament...
In a non-welfaristic framework, Sen (1993) extends the first fundamental welfare theorem by demonstr...
In economies with public goods, we identify a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence o...
Welfare theorems are concerned with the conditions under which decentralized decision making can lea...
Many normatively oriented economists, legal academics and other policy analysts appear to be welfar...
A quasi-linear social choice problem is concerned with choosing one among a finite set of public pro...
In our previous paper, "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods...," (1977) we presented a mechanism for ...
We study equity in economies where a set of agents commonly own a technology producing a non-rival g...
First Version: September 2001; This Version: January 2002This paper investigates extensions of the t...
This dissertation studies strategic social influence in the presence of a self-control problem and e...
We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic p...
We consider the aggregation of individual agents ’ von Neumann-Morgenstern’s util-ity functions into...
The article deals with the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics for production economies wi...
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