In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditors involved in the problem via merging or splitting of their individual claims. The paper provides characterization theorems for the non manipulable rules, the no advantageous merging parametric rules and the no advantageous splitting parametric rules.Publicad
This paper models efficient design of bankruptcy mechanisms under multi-lateral asymmetric informati...
In a unified framework of allocation problems with at least three en-tities (or agents), we show tha...
This paper explores additivity-like properties ful led by bankruptcy rules. Our main result is that...
In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditor...
In the domain of bankruptcy problems, we show that non manipulability via merging and splitting clai...
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoret...
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoret...
The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide ho...
This paper analyzes bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankrupt...
This paper studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptc...
As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems...
This paper axiomatically studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by adequately gene...
We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy probl...
This paper provides a natural way of reaching an agreement between two prominent proposals in a bank...
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of ban...
This paper models efficient design of bankruptcy mechanisms under multi-lateral asymmetric informati...
In a unified framework of allocation problems with at least three en-tities (or agents), we show tha...
This paper explores additivity-like properties ful led by bankruptcy rules. Our main result is that...
In a bankruptcy problem framework we consider rules immune to possible manipulations by the creditor...
In the domain of bankruptcy problems, we show that non manipulability via merging and splitting clai...
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoret...
In this paper, we analyze bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility (NTU) from a game theoret...
The commitment among agents has always been a difficult task, especially when they have to decide ho...
This paper analyzes bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankrupt...
This paper studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility as a generalization of bankruptc...
As it is known, there is no rule satisfying Additivity in the complete domain of bankruptcy problems...
This paper axiomatically studies bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by adequately gene...
We provide a general coalitional procedure that characterizes a family of rules for bankruptcy probl...
This paper provides a natural way of reaching an agreement between two prominent proposals in a bank...
We introduce a game form that captures a noncooperative dimension of the consistency property of ban...
This paper models efficient design of bankruptcy mechanisms under multi-lateral asymmetric informati...
In a unified framework of allocation problems with at least three en-tities (or agents), we show tha...
This paper explores additivity-like properties ful led by bankruptcy rules. Our main result is that...
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