Concepts of Consciousness and Representation. Merits and Critiques of Higher and Same Order Monitoring Accounts in the Theories of the Mental

The concept of representation has been renewed in the philosophy of the mental since the 1990s epistemically. But there are no unified accounts and different concepts of representation and consciousness as well. Therefore, differentiated analysis is desirable to give some clarifications of “consciousness” and “representation”. In particular, the higher order monitoring and same order monitoring theories have their merits in the philosophy of the mental, but their basic concept of higher and same order mental states do not give an adequate account in the theory of the mental because the basic concept is not an intentional relationship of representation. Therefore, an outlook to an alternative turn is given as a tentative orientation.The concept of representation has been renewed in the philosophy of the mental since the 1990s epistemically. But there are no unified accounts and different concepts of representation and consciousness as well. Therefore, differentiated analysis is desirable to give some clarifications of “consciousness” and “representation”. In particular, the higher order monitoring and same order monitoring theories have their merits in the philosophy of the mental, but their basic concept of higher and same order mental states do not give an adequate account in the theory of the mental because the basic concept is not an intentional relationship of representation. Therefore, an outlook to an alternative turn is given as a tentative orientation