DDE's Looping Trolley Problem

I consider and reject two solutions to what I shall call “The Looping Trolley Problem” for the Doctrine of Double Effect. This is the problem that, whereas it appears that it would be permissible to divert the trolley away from five and onto one in Judith Jarvis Thomson's looping trolley scenario (Loop) and similar scenarios, DDE appears to imply that it would be impermissible. The first solution I consider is Frances Kamm’s argument that you could permissibly divert the trolley in Loop consistently with her Doctrine of Triple Effect which may, I argue, be understood as a version of DDE. In response, I argue that the action-theoretic underpinnings of Kamm’s application of DTE to Loop are unsound, and that, even if they were not, Kamm’s response would intensify the “closeness” problem for DDE in previously unappreciated ways. The second solution maintains that Thomson’s argument for the permissibility of diverting in Loop relies on problematic intuitions. In response, I give an argument for the permissibility of diverting that does not rely on the offending intuitions. In the process, I provide a variant of Loop where I argue that DDE generates a moral dilemma, implying both that you must and that you must not divert