Locating Presupposition and Shared Knowledge in Pragmatics

This paper investigates the position of presupposition and shared knowledge in pragmatics. As a field of language study, pragmatics is the use and interpretation of verbal and non-verbal elements of communication which participants of discourse deploy in conveying messages (illocutionary goals). To understand what is meant by a speaker, the hearer relies on different pragmatic variables, including presupposition and shared knowledge. In this study, we examine the functionality of presupposition and shared knowledge in the transaction of “meaning”, as evident in the way participants of discourse use and interpret language. The study explores Frege’s Theory of Presupposition (cited in Levinson 1983, p. 170) as a theoretical framework. Different findings are established by this study: presupposition and shared knowledge are pragmatic inference tools; the two concepts operate at literal and non-literal sentential levels; the concepts are referents; they are based on conventions; and they prevent pragmatic failure