We propose a data-driven machine learning approach to flag bid-rigging cartels in the Brazilian road maintenance sector. First, we apply a clustering algorithm to group the tenders based on their attributes. Second, we use the labels created by the clustering algorithm as a target variable to predict them using a classifier. We rank the predictors according to their relevance to decrease the number of false positive (detect cartel when it does not exist) and false negative (do not detect cartel when it does exist) predictions. Our results shed light on the need to use a range of predictors to recognize the vast profile of strategies practiced by bid-rigging cartels, such as misleading competitive dynamics, bid combination, and cover bidding...
This paper tests how well the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) performs to detect bidrigging ...
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition poli...
This study focused on detecting horizontal and vertical collusion within Indonesian government procu...
We combine machine learning techniques with statistical screens computed from the distribution of b...
This thesis studies a method of cartel screening where descriptive statistics from the bid distribut...
[EN] Collusion is an illegal practice by which some competing companies secretly agree on the prices...
A Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU), como órgão central do sistema de controle interno do Poder Exe...
Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance off...
We investigate the transnational transferability of statistical screening methods originally develo...
This paper explores the potential of using the Moran’s I statistic to detect complementary bidding o...
The paper applies simple statistical screens to a bid-rigging cartel in Switzerland, and shows how w...
Is it possible to predict corruption and public inefficiency in public procurement? With the prolife...
The costs and impacts of government corruption range from impairing a country's economic growth to a...
Procurement practices are often characterized by competitive tendering. The overarching purpose of t...
Orientador: Prof. Walmes Marques ZevianiMonografia (especialização) - Universidade Federal do Paraná...
This paper tests how well the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) performs to detect bidrigging ...
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition poli...
This study focused on detecting horizontal and vertical collusion within Indonesian government procu...
We combine machine learning techniques with statistical screens computed from the distribution of b...
This thesis studies a method of cartel screening where descriptive statistics from the bid distribut...
[EN] Collusion is an illegal practice by which some competing companies secretly agree on the prices...
A Controladoria-Geral da União (CGU), como órgão central do sistema de controle interno do Poder Exe...
Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance off...
We investigate the transnational transferability of statistical screening methods originally develo...
This paper explores the potential of using the Moran’s I statistic to detect complementary bidding o...
The paper applies simple statistical screens to a bid-rigging cartel in Switzerland, and shows how w...
Is it possible to predict corruption and public inefficiency in public procurement? With the prolife...
The costs and impacts of government corruption range from impairing a country's economic growth to a...
Procurement practices are often characterized by competitive tendering. The overarching purpose of t...
Orientador: Prof. Walmes Marques ZevianiMonografia (especialização) - Universidade Federal do Paraná...
This paper tests how well the method proposed by Bajari and Ye (2003) performs to detect bidrigging ...
How many cartels are there? The answer is important in assessing the efficiency of competition poli...
This study focused on detecting horizontal and vertical collusion within Indonesian government procu...