Latenz. Das Problem des Anfangs in Schellings Die Weltalter

Schelling’s conception of the beginning of time in the Ages of the World is new. It differs from all classic acounts of the philosophy of time since time for Schelling is no longer a privation of eternity rather than an entity on its own. Time stands for itself and is irreducibel from the historical context in which it occurs or hides itself. Starting from this turning point in the tradition of the philosophy of time the paper advances the thesis that Schelling’s genealogical approach in the Ages of the World can only be understood in terms of the concept of latency. Time is nothing more or less than the dialectic between latency and actuality which comes up with the free action of individuals following their expectation, hopes and desires troughout life. For Schelling, time is therefore a moving constellation of past, present and future, and thus needs a form of narrative representation that is able to take into account an irresolvable crisis like this