Representation revisited: Concepts, typologies, and case selection

Empirical scholars in political science have generally allowed normative theorists to conceptualize key concepts such as democracy, accountability, and representation (Collier and Adcock 1999; Pitkin 1967). For some empiricists, taking the time to revisit the very concepts that they are purportedly measuring and testing seems at best too philosophical, and hence out of their domain (although see Goertz 2006 for a comprehensive treatment of social science concepts). Consequently, the empirical literature on representation has focused too heavily on statistical roll-call analyses, which to a certain degree can help us ascertain the extent to which legislators represent their constituents in legislatures and Congress. Substantive representation, however, involves much more than how legislators vote. In order for political scientists to understand why, we must think carefully about what representation involves. This essay will examine the concept of representation by briefly considering what normative theorists such as Jane Mansbridge and Hanna Pitkin have said about the subject, and then analyzing the concept of representation through the lens of what more recent empirical researchers have said about concepts, typologies, and case selection