Losing out on substance but winning procedurally? The European Parliament and accountability in crisis legislation

Recent studies have found that the European Parliament (EP) had limited substantive influence on the European Union’s response to the European debt crisis. It has been argued that Parliament compensated this loss by expanding its procedural power in crisis legislation; that is, its ability to hold the implementing institutions to account. In this study, we systematically assess the nature of parliamentary accountability and the conditions under which the EP has been successful at increasing its oversight powers. We do so by using new data on the accountability provisions included in concluded economic and financial legislation, scrutinized by the EP between 2009 and 2016. We find that Parliament has been more likely to gain oversight powers in crisis legislation, package deals, and salient legislative files. Our findings provide a more nuanced picture of Parliament’s inter-institutional gains and losses in recent years and add to our understanding of the EP’s account-holding role