This article presents a multicommodity, discrete-time, distributed, and noncooperative routing algorithm, which is proved to converge to an equilibrium in the presence of heterogeneous, unknown, time-varying but bounded delays. Under mild assumptions on the latency functions, which describe the cost associated with the network paths, two algorithms are proposed: The former assumes that each commodity relies only on measurements of the latencies associated with its own paths; the latter assumes that each commodity has (at least indirectly) access to the measures of the latencies of all the network paths. Both algorithms are proven to drive the system state to an invariant set that approximates and contains the Wardrop equilibrium, defined as...
The paper studies routing in loss networks in the framework of a non-cooperative game with selfish u...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
In a discrete routing game, each of n selfish users employs a mixed strategy to ship its (unsplittab...
This paper presents a multi-commodity, discrete- time, distributed and non-cooperative routing algo...
This paper presents a discrete-time, distributed and non-cooperative routing algorithm, which is pr...
We analyze a routing scheme for a broad class of networks which converges (in the Cesaro sense) with...
iv This thesis deals with dynamic, load-adaptive rerouting policies in game theoretic settings. In t...
This thesis deals with dynamic, load-adaptive rerouting policies in game theoretic settings. In the ...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
Global communication networks like the Internet often lack a central authority that monitors and reg...
1 Introduction We consider routing problems in the Wardrop model. We are given a networkequipped wit...
Abstract. We introduce a model to study the temporal behaviour of selfish agents in networks. So far...
Abstract. In this work, we introduce and study a new model for selfish routing over non-cooperative ...
International audienceWe study the traffic routing problem in networks whose users try to minimize t...
In this paper, we study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are reve...
The paper studies routing in loss networks in the framework of a non-cooperative game with selfish u...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
In a discrete routing game, each of n selfish users employs a mixed strategy to ship its (unsplittab...
This paper presents a multi-commodity, discrete- time, distributed and non-cooperative routing algo...
This paper presents a discrete-time, distributed and non-cooperative routing algorithm, which is pr...
We analyze a routing scheme for a broad class of networks which converges (in the Cesaro sense) with...
iv This thesis deals with dynamic, load-adaptive rerouting policies in game theoretic settings. In t...
This thesis deals with dynamic, load-adaptive rerouting policies in game theoretic settings. In the ...
According to Wardrop's first principle, agents in a congested network choose their routes selfishly,...
Global communication networks like the Internet often lack a central authority that monitors and reg...
1 Introduction We consider routing problems in the Wardrop model. We are given a networkequipped wit...
Abstract. We introduce a model to study the temporal behaviour of selfish agents in networks. So far...
Abstract. In this work, we introduce and study a new model for selfish routing over non-cooperative ...
International audienceWe study the traffic routing problem in networks whose users try to minimize t...
In this paper, we study the efficiency of selfish routing problems in which traffic demands are reve...
The paper studies routing in loss networks in the framework of a non-cooperative game with selfish u...
AbstractWe study the degradation in network performance caused by the selfish behavior of noncoopera...
In a discrete routing game, each of n selfish users employs a mixed strategy to ship its (unsplittab...