«La libertà è un concetto?». Intorno a una traccia kantiana nella filosofia positiva di Schelling

This article moves from the following lines of Martin Heidegger: «but however far Schelling travels on a new path into the essence of human freedom, Kant’s basic position in the question of freedom is not undermined, but only confirmed. Kant says that the fact of freedom is incomprehensible. The only thing that we comprehend is its incomprehensibility. And freedom’s incomprehensibility consists in the fact that it resists com-prehension since it is because freedom transposes us into the actuation of Being, not in the mere representation of it». Our research means to prove the validity of this opinion in the last philosophy of Schelling. The main hypothesis is that the distinction between positive and negative philosophy is the final Schellingian attempt to thematize the exteriority of freedom (res facti) from the conceptual thought. The demonstration of this point will allow us to show the actuality of Schellingian positive philosophy and its capability to dialogue with the today’s philosophies of event