On Frege's Legacy in the Later Wittgenstein and Brandom[Sobre el legado de Frege en el Wittgenstein tardío y en Brandom]

It is generally accepted that Frege is a powerful logician who created completely original tools for analysis which have become the firm ground on which 20th Century logic and analytical philosophy is built, however indirect his influence might be. His specific attempts to construct the foundations of arithmetic, however, are frequently judged to be ill–conceived and no more nowadays than a curiosity of 19th Century philosophy. In the light of scepticism that there is anything left to share after Wittgenstein’s criticism of Frege both in the Tractatus and in Philosophical Investigations, as expressed in particular by P.M.S. Hacker, it is the aim of this paper, first, to show that there is a strand of philosophical thinking that runs from Kant to Frege to Wittgenstein which is worth exploring and developing: Robert B. Brandom’s enterprise of rational pragmatism and inferential semantics is one outstanding example for developing original philosophical thought based on the conviction that Frege’s inheritance is very much alive and worthwhile exploring, along with Kant’s, Hegel’s and Wittgenstein’s, among others. The aim of this paper is, secondly, to explore the seemingly divergent routs some aspects of Frege’s legacy take when reworked by Wittgenstein and Brandom, and further if and how, respectively, these divergences might be seen, after all, as nothing more than local ramifications of one continuous stream of philosophy