Towards Distributed Accommodation of Covert Attacks in Interconnected Systems

The problem of mitigating maliciously injected signals in interconnected systems is dealt with in this paper. We consider the class of covert attacks, as they are stealthy and cannot be detected by conventional means in centralized settings. Distributed architectures can be leveraged for revealing these stealthy attacks by exploiting communication and local model knowledge. We show how such detection schemes can be improved to estimate the action of an attacker and we propose an accommodation scheme in order to mitigate or neutralize abnormal behavior of a system under attack.2020 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. A. Barboni and T. Parisini, "Towards Distributed Accommodation of Covert Attacks in Interconnected Systems," in 59th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), Jeju, South Korea, 2020, pp. 5731-5736, doi: 10.1109/CDC42340.2020.9304112